

THE ARTICULATION OF THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY IN
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE POST-MANNHEIM ERA

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. . .we must see to it that a sociological history of ideas concerns itself with the actual thought of society, and not merely with self-perpetuating and supposedly self-contained systems of ideas elaborated within a rigid academic tradition.

Karl Mannheim

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PREFACE

Few concepts play a larger part in present-day discussions of historical and political topics than does that of ideology.... 1

There seems to be no more cogent justification of an inquiry into the concept of ideology and the uses to which that concept has been put by American political science than the opening quotation from George Lichtheim's The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays.² No idea seems more central to an understanding of political thought and behavior; no concept seems to have inspired more thought and scholarly writing; no construct appears to be so variously used as ideology.

That the work of Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, should serve as the touchstone for this inquiry derives from the seminal nature of that analysis. Not only did Mannheim advance a conceptualization of the nature of ideology, but he also presented an analysis of the role that ideological thought plays in the modern world and a theory of how an understanding of ideology can serve as a basis for resolving the modern intellectual crisis of relativism and mutually-exclusive political positions.

The present analysis will have as its foci a summary of Mannheim's work, Ideology and Utopia, a presentation of what

American political scientists have written concerning specific ideologies and a discussion of the implications of this output, and, finally, an examination of the studies which have been advanced by members of the discipline dealing with the meaning and use of the concept of ideology and an analysis of the relevance and import of these papers.

The materials surveyed and discussed in this study represent selected articles which have appeared in the American Political Science Review (APSR), during the period 1936 through 1976. The onset date of this study corresponds with the American publication of Ideology and Utopia. The APSR has been chosen for this survey because of its rank among American journals specializing in political matters. While the Review represents only a fragment of the papers published at any given time, it is the assumption of this study that, given its status, it will be generally reflective of the accepted currents and paradigms of the discipline at any point in time. A further assumption is made here to the effect that, while the selection of papers for inclusion in the study is impressionistic, a sampling sufficient to justify this paper's conclusions has been developed.

CHAPTER I

THE THOUGHT OF KARL MANNHEIM

. . . The distinctive character of social science discourse is to be sought in the fact that every assertion, no matter how objective it may be, has ramifications extending beyond the limits of science itself. 2

Karl Mannheim

In view of the scope and depth of Karl Mannheim's thought on ideology and on the socio-historical causes of the phenomenon of ideology, the historical manifestation of ideological thought, and the intellectual progress which could be possible through the appreciation of the socially-determined nature of thought, it is appropriate and necessary that this study commence with a review of Mannheim's thought and theory. As a caveat, it must be admitted that Mannheim's prose was turgid and that the precis which follows necessarily excludes the nuances of much of Mannheim's analysis. Nevertheless, it is believed that what follows is an accurate representation of the major tenets and logic of the author's work.

Taking as his point of departure the existence of a multiplicity of fundamentally divergent political perspectives, each with exclusive values, definitions and modes of analysis,

Mannheim argued that the modern era was suffering from an intellectual crisis. Horizontal and vertical social mobility, which implied that the thought patterns of society's lower strata gained visibility, validity, and prestige, precipitated social instability and the erosion of the unitary world view which characterized the Middle Ages. The recognition of the plethora of world views led Mannheim to ask what he described as the "fateful question"³: how it was possible for identical human thought-processes concerned with the same world to produce much divergent conceptions of the world? The answer to that question, for Mannheim, consisted in the assertion that the thought-processes of men were actually not at all identical, but that there existed instead numerous alternative thought patterns which produced conflicting conceptions of the world.

For Mannheim, thought ". . . constitutes a complex which cannot be readily detached either from the psychological roots of the emotional and vital impulses which underlie it or from the situation in which it arises and which it seeks to solve."⁴ Men in general do not think, according to Mannheim, but rather men in sociological groups develop styles of thought peculiar to the group in response to the situations which characterize their common situation. Men ". . . act with and against one another in diversely organized groups, and while doing so they think with and against one another. Those persons, bound

together into groups, strive in accordance with the character and position of the groups to which they belong to change the surrounding world . . . or to attempt to maintain it in a given condition. It is the direction of this will to change or maintain, of this collective activity, which produces the guiding thread for the emergence of their problems, their concepts, and their forms of thought." ⁵ Thought then was seen to be a function of the group basis of life and as an instrument of collective action of the respective groups in their struggle for social supremacy.

This sociological conception of thought had obvious implications for epistemology and for the understanding of political life. According to Mannheim, the breakdown of a unitary world view in the modern era led to the development of a particular form of epistemology. Modern epistemology sought to overcome dogma by seeking validity through the analysis of the knowing subject. All epistemology postulates a polarity between object and subject; during periods of unity, there exists a tendency to base existence on the object to be known; during periods of disunity, the emphasis of epistemology turns to the knowing subject. Mannheim criticized modern epistemology and the psychological and philosophical analyses based upon it by arguing that it was apparent that the perceiving subject was neither a safe nor a fruitful point of departure for arriving at validity in the study of man and

society because its mechanistic view of man led to an inability to say anything about the goals of conduct or to interpret men's actions in terms of meaning. The deposed, invalid world-views at least, according to Mannheim, served even if falsely ". . . to make coherent the fragments of the reality of inner psychic as well as objective external experiences, and to place them with reference to a certain complex of conduct." ⁶

The sociological approach corrected the false assumptions of conceiving the autonomous individual as separate from the group which heretofore had characterized the epistemological and psychological methods of studying cultural phenomena. "What is most important about (the sociological conception) is that it puts an end to the fiction of the detachment of the individual from the group, within the matrix of which the individual thinks and experiences." ⁷

For Mannheim, the assertion of the group basis of thought implied a new approach to objectivity, a new mastery for man over what previously had been determined, and, ultimately, a science of politics. In the opening pages of Ideology and Utopia, Mannheim wrote, "A new type of objectivity in the social sciences is attainable not through the exclusion of evaluations but through the critical awareness and control of them." ⁸ By this Mannheim meant that the individual's intellectual interest, derived from the context of the collective interests and activities of the group and providing

the thought-model for the ordering of experience, would serve as the focus of analysis so as to make visible the unconscious motivations behind thought and thus to be able to understand them and to escape their heretofore determining effect. For Mannheim, ". . . it is precisely when the hitherto concealed dependence of thought on group existence and its rootedness in action becomes visible that it really becomes possible . . . to attain a new mode of control over previously uncontrolled factors in thought." ⁹ The culmination of the insight into the relationship between the historical-social context and thought lay in the development of the "sociology of knowledge." This discipline, described by Mannheim as the "systemization of doubt," ¹⁰ was the end product of three tendencies in the modern world: the awareness of collective unconscious motivations, the establishment of a new intellectual history interpreting changes in ideas in relation to social-historical changes, and a revision of the discipline of epistemology to account for the social nature of knowledge. The aim of the sociology of knowledge, in Mannheim's words, was ". . . to perfect the techniques of reconstructing social history to such an extent that instead of scattered isolated facts, one will be able to perceive the social structure as a whole, i.e., the web of interacting social forces from which have arisen the various modes of observing and thinking...." ¹¹

Mannheim's thought had as its central concept ideology. It was in the politics of the modern democracies, according

to Mannheim, where ideas were more clearly representative of groups and classes that the social bases of thought become visible. It was in the forum of political struggle that men became aware of the collective unconscious motivations of thought. Political discussion became the ". . . tearing off of disguises . . . the unmasking of those unconscious motives which bind the group existence to its cultural aspirations and its theoretical arguments." ¹² This mutual psychic annihilation, this attack on the whole life-situation of an opponent precipitated an intellectual crisis which, according to Mannheim, was ". . . characterized by two slogan-like concepts 'ideology and utopia'." ¹³

Ideology, in Mannheim's definition, described the insight that certain groups become so interest-bound in their thought that they are incapable of seeing the reality of a situation the elements of which undermine their position of domination. Utopian thought, on the other hand, characterizes oppressed groups whose interest in the destruction and transformation of the society is so strong that they see only those factors which tend to negate the existing structure.

There exist two distinct variations of the term "ideology" for Mannheim. The first, or "particular," conception is ". . . implied when the term denotes that we are sceptical of the ideas and representations advanced by our opponents. They are regarded as more or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation, the true

recognition of which would not be in accord with his interests."¹⁴
 The second, or "total" conception of ideology, is the
 ". . . ideology of an age or of a concrete historico-social
 group, e.g., of a class, when we are concerned with the
 characteristics and composition of the total structure of the
 mind of this epoch or of this group."¹⁵

Common to the two conceptions is the fact that neither focuses on what is advanced in a political assertion; both rather focus on the assertor, seeking to determine his social condition in order to ascertain the meaning of what is said. The particular and total conceptions differ, however, in several aspects. First, the particular conception identifies only the content of an assertion as being ideological; the total conception calls the subject's entire Weltanschauung into question and attempts to understand his assertions and their underlying conceptual apparatus in terms of his collective life. Secondly, the particular conception analyzes ideas on a purely psychological level assuming a criterion of validity shared between the assertor and the listener; the total conception conceives of completely divergent thought-systems and modes of interpretation between men of different ideologies.

The assertion of the total conception of ideology, had, for Mannheim two consequences: "first we clearly perceive that human affairs cannot be understood by an isolation of their elements. Every fact and event in an historical period

is only explicable in terms of meaning, and meaning in its turn always refers to another meaning. Thus the conception of the unity and interdependence of meaning in a period always underlies the interpretation of that period. Secondly, this interdependent system of meanings varies both in all its parts and in its totality from one historical period to another. Thus the re-interpretation of that continuous and coherent change in meaning becomes the main concern of our modern historical sciences." ¹⁶

In utilizing the theory of ideology as the basis for the sociology of knowledge, Mannheim proceeded by evaluating two possible approaches for the investigation of ideology. One approach was to confine the inquiry to a demonstration of the interrelationship between an intellectual point of view and a social position. A second, more sophisticated and more fruitful course of inquiry combined what Mannheim termed a non-evaluative analysis of ideology with a definite epistemology. The issue of epistemology was, of course, crucial because of the problem of resolving the question of the reliability of knowledge. Mannheim resolved that issue by formulating what he described as the concept of "relationism." Relativism, recognizing the tie between the social position of the subject and the product of his thought, nevertheless approached the issue of reliability by using the old theory of knowledge which assumed a static, absolute reality independent of the subject. For Mannheim, given the

total conception of the nature of ideology, this theory of knowledge was in obvious error and no longer capable of serving as a test of validity. Rather, Mannheim arrived at the term "relationism" to describe the proper criterion of validity. Relationism was based on the ". . . assumption that there are spheres of thought in which it is impossible to conceive of absolute truths existing independently of the values and position of the subject and unrelated to the social context." ¹⁷

For Mannheim, however, a non-evaluative conception of ideology would not suffice. While such an approach, which does not seek to judge the correctness of the ideas it analyzes but is confined merely to the discovery of the relationship between mental structures and their underlying life-structures, was the basis of the relational mode of analysis, Mannheim argued that an evaluative approach to the study of ideology was possible. Relationism, it will be remembered, asserted that a particular system of thought or meaning was possible and valid only in a particular socio-historical setting. ¹⁸ However, despite the fact that such knowledge was not absolute, it was nevertheless a form of knowledge. That knowledge, of course, was dependent on the mode of approach to the object by the knower and it was the historico-social situation which determined the conceptual apparatus and frame of reference of the subject. Such a

culturally-determined apparatus was indeed necessary to formulate knowledge. The non-evaluative conception of ideology recognizes this fact and the resulting partial nature of knowledge and, simply, seeks to analyze and determine the essences of the relationship of partial knowledges to the structure of history and society. The evaluative conception of ideology, on the other hand, goes beyond this end by recognizing the fact that it is impossible for the subject to be emancipated from ontological and ethical presuppositions and by being aware that every point of view is particular to a specific and definite social situation. For the evaluation approach, such presuppositions are not barriers to knowledge. The awareness of them is rather the key to superceding the determination of man by social forces and thus to the transcendence of particular points of view and the development of a comprehension of the whole of thought.

More concretely, for Mannheim the relation of events and ideas is not an arbitrary one. Rather, this relationship is one which follows a necessity which can be comprehended. The sociology of knowledge is then a technique for analyzing the culture of an epoch, a mode to ". . . discover in the totality of the historical complex the role, significance, and meaning of each component element." ¹⁹ This analysis cannot be non-evaluative since "history as history is unintelligible unless certain of its aspects are emphasized

in contrast to others. This selection and accentuation of certain aspects of historical totality may be regarded as the first step in the direction which ultimately leads to an evaluative procedure and to ontological judgments." ²⁰

The purpose of ontology in the evaluative conception of ideology is not to define absolute truth but rather to separate the genuine from the false among the existing and competing norms, modes of thought and patterns of behavior which exist in a given historical period. The problem is not to comprehend an absolute reality but to determine which ideas are valid within a historico-social situation.

This evaluative conception of ideology, based on presuppositions concerning reality, must necessarily be a dynamic process because reality is in a state of constant flux. "This conception of ideology (and utopia) maintains that beyond the commonly recognized sources of error we must also reckon with the effects of a distorted mental structure. It takes cognizance of the fact that the 'reality' which we fail to comprehend may be a dynamic one; and that in the same historical epoch and in the same society there may be several distorted types of inner mental structure, some because they have not yet grown up to the present, and others because they are already beyond the present. In either case, however, the reality to be comprehended is distorted and concealed, for this conception of ideology and utopia deals with a reality that discloses itself only in actual practice." ²¹

The dynamic synthesis prescribed by Mannheim as being necessary to analyze ideologies and to develop the science of politics is possible only by the intelligentsia. "Such an experimental outlook, unceasingly sensitive to the dynamic nature of society and to its wholeness, is not likely to be developed by a class occupying a middle position but only by a relatively classless stratum which is not too firmly situated in the social order." ²² The intelligentsia, according to Mannheim, is a heterogenous group both sociologically and historically and, as such, ". . . subsumes in itself all those interests with which social life is permeated." ²³

Thus, in summary, Karl Mannheim, in Ideology and Utopia, offered a critique of the predicament of modern world, a theory of man's thought, and a prescription for the attainment of a new order of objectivity which could free man from the determinism which was his fate. Rejecting the presuppositions of positivist science, Mannheim argued that ". . . participation in the living context of social life is a presupposition of the understanding of the inner nature of this living context. The type of participation which the thinker enjoys determines how he shall formulate his problems. The disregard of qualitative elements and the complete restraint of the will does not constitute objectivity but is instead the negation of the essential quality of the object." ²⁴ Knowledge in the social sciences, according to Mannheim, is different from the

formal, mechanistic knowledge of the natural sciences in that it must transcend the enumeration of facts and seek to "approximate the model of situationally determined knowledge."²⁵ The task of the science of politics ". . . is that it see reality with the eyes of acting human beings, and that it teach men, in action, to understand even their opponents in the light of their actual motives and their position in the historical-social situation. Political sociology in this sense must be conscious of its function as the fullest possible synthesis of the tendencies of an epoch. It must teach what alone is teachable, namely, structural relationships; the judgments themselves cannot be taught but we can become more or less adequately aware of them and we can interpret them."²⁶

CHAPTER II

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE CONSIDERATION OF MANNHEIM'S IDEAL TYPES OF IDEOLOGY

Given the thought of Mannheim regarding the phenomenon of ideology, it should be of some insight to consider the thought of American political science, as expressed through the American Political Science Review, on the same subject.

In reviewing the literature from the Review in the past forty years, it becomes apparent that a good deal of concern has been expressed relative to the realities, the justifications, and the evolutions of what Mannheim termed the ideal-types of political ideologies and it may be of value to consider these expressions of concern, to ascertain whether the level of sophistication of American political scientists towards these ideologies accords in any way with Mannheim's analysis and to determine if a conclusion or conclusions can be reached about the view of the discipline towards ideology.

In 1944, in an article entitled "Reason, Value Theory and the Theory of Democracy,"²⁷ J. Roland Pennock attempted to ground the democratic doctrine on the principles of reason in order to show that democracy is ". . . the ideally best form of government."²⁸ Arguing that democratic theory had always rested on propositions concerning the objectivity of

ethical values and the rationality of man, Pennock noted that modern day skepticism and relativism had produced an anti-rationalism challenging the bases of democratic theory. Pennock contended that while proof of the absolute validity of the ethical and ontological core of democratic theory might not be possible, all that was necessary for the "proof" of its superiority was to demonstrate that such values were generally binding on men. No "cosmic scheme of values,"²⁹ then, was necessary and it was Pennock's peroration to his fellow political scientists, and democrats, that their empirical studies of political behavior should be directed towards finding in human nature a basis for these universally binding principles of right conduct.

The concern for expositing a scientific justification for democratic principles was reiterated in an article in the April, 1945 edition of the APSR. Herman Finer, author of "Towards a Democratic Theory,"³⁰ began his article by noting that Soviet Communism had as its doctrine Marxism and that Naxism had racialism. What, asked Finer, had democracy as its linch pin? His inability to identify a doctrine for democracy and his concern for the continued viability of the democratic form of government led Finer to advance the argument that democracy should be the process of "steady, if anxiously contested, accommodation among disputing individuals and groups."³¹ Analyzing the current state of the democratic peoples, Finer concluded that those nations failed to

conceive of democracy as he did and lacked the temperament to achieve such a conception. The answer, according to Finer, to the discrepancy between the popular consciousness and the values necessary to the stability and viability of democracy lay not in a Marxian class struggle doctrine because such a view oversimplifies social processes and diminished or even negated the importance of the individual actor in the political arena. The problem with democracy, wrote Finer, and the solution to that problem, was to be found in the individual. "There is a shocking fatalism in the ascription of dynamic forces to classes; it leads to government, not by responsible insight, but by armed cliché." ³² Democratic theory, according to Finer, beings with freedom for the individual and what is necessary to be avoided is disruptive egoism which leads to either the abdication or destruction of the possibilities of self-assertion. What is critical to this avoidance is the relation of the self to the needs of the nation, a relation which requires both rational awareness and the emotive, altruistic understanding of one's fellow citizens. Democracy, then, must have a spiritual character, a faith in a rationalist age.

The key element of the faith, according to Finer, is the realization that because there exists in this age no demonstrably transcendent principle of the good and the true, that no individual or doctrine is superior to others. "This

admission - that no faith is tenable but the one that there can be none that is not the product of accommodation - animates our duty to secure and guarantee to others (who would therefore guarantee to us) the social and governmental arrangements which will constitute the maximum resistance to arrogance, force, and repression, give the maximum latitude for spontaneity of ideology and action to all, that is, which will keep the way open for diverse loyalties and interests, and give the least ground for any person to sacrifice another." ³³

This doctrine, or faith, according to Finer, would serve the same intent for democracy as the ideologies of the Fascists, namely, "to serve to clarify the relationship between the kaleidoscope of hundreds of diverse events in the common man's environment and experience, the many everyday seemingly eccentric and arbitrary happenings and their civic relevance to him. It was to replace the chaos of the city streets by a world's meaning." ³⁴ Opposed to the guarantees of democracy's superiority previously sought by theorists, Finer concludes that all that is necessary to the survival of the democratic mode is the self-restraint of the individual in his freedom, a self-restraint grounded on a spiritual faith and a rational belief in the non-existence of any other faith with a claim to the unification of man.

The theme of the mid-20th century condition of democratic-liberalism was noted again in a 1949 article by David Easton.

In "Walter Bagehot and Liberal Realism,"³⁵ Easton examined the thought of the 19th century critic of the liberal doctrine, Bagehot, and concluded that the contradictions which Bagehot and other early writers had noted continued to flaw the condition of democratic thought and practice in the modern era. Liberalism was on the defensive, wrote Easton, and its perceived deficiencies derived from its failure to address and resolve the obvious problem of the divorce between the theory and the practice of liberalism, its ". . . unconscionable indifference to the material conditions of society and its failure to put its theories to the test of social reality."³⁶

Liberalism had always been doctrinaire and abstract, wrote Easton, proclaiming the need for freedom, equality, and self-government, but it had just as consistently failed to examine the social and political conditions which were requisite to the realization of these needs. Prior to the ascendancy of the middle class, argued Easton, these liberal values were levers to be used against the mercantilist society. However, after succeeding to power, the attachment of the middle class to existing economic forms precluded the pursuit of these ideals. Thus, the contradictions between liberalism's professed ideals and its practice were exposed and have existed since.

Bagehot, according to Easton, was one of the first political thinkers to perceive the liberal contradiction.

Based on positivist thought, Bagehot urged liberal political theorists to scientifically discover the facts of social reality and, on the basis of these empirical findings, to realistically assess the possibility of fulfilling liberal values.

Easton's conclusion was that both Bagehot's prescription, "that social fact and political ends must be brought into harmony if a doctrine is to survive,"³⁷ and his recommendation that liberalism either alter its values to conform to reality or maintain its values in the hope and with the intent of realizing a change in social conditions retained their validity for 20th century liberal doctrine.

In 1950, the historian Arthur P. Whitaker addressed the state of liberal democratic tradition in the context of its development in Latin America. Writing in "Pathology of Democracy in Latin America,"³⁸ Whitaker argued that the principles of liberalism in Latin America were adopted from their European roots and reflected a bifurcation evident in the doctrine in all its manifestations. Whitaker wrote that the modern evolution of democracy, emerging from a concern with the principle of liberty to an emphasis on the goal of equality, was productive of a division in the ranks of liberals between the conservative democrats and the radicals whose concern with equality was based on the experience that liberty had failed to lead to the equality which is the

essence of democracy. The shift to the concern with the equalitarian principle had, urged Whitaker, broadened the democratic idea to include not only the political but the social and economic spheres as well. The injection of an economic content into an ideology which was originally political had the effect of reinforcing the conservative-radical division, according to Whitaker, since the radicals became identified with state interventionist policies and the conservatives conversely with a laissez-faire doctrine. The clear trend which Whitaker perceived as a result of this analysis was that, despite the common assumption of the democratic identification, the conservative wing of the liberal heritage equated more closely with an authoritarian perspective than with the radical liberal persuasion, itself tending to similarity with the ideology and substance of socialism.

In 1952, Alpheus T. Mason, writing in "American Individualism: Fact and Fiction,"³⁹ addressed the issue of the evolution of the liberal tradition from the perspective of the American historical experience. The "dynamic thread"⁴⁰ of our political fabric, wrote Mason, has been the dichotomy between the political ideals of the nation, freedom, and, implicitly, equality, and "inevitable" economic inequality. The culmination of this struggle was realized in the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt which Harold Laski described as "the completion of the continuous development of discontent with

traditional individualism." ⁴¹

After the New Deal, dedicated to the protection and advancement of the welfare of the masses through the state, American political action and thought, according to Mason, became basically collectivistic in an effort to achieve 18th century ideals through a redistribution of power through the agency of the government. The danger in this collectivist posture, wrote Mason, lay not so much in the loss of freedom but rather in the fact that private enterprise, having lost the battle over laissez-faire, might win the war by dominating the very administrative and regulatory machinery created for its control. Free government, concluded Mason, depended upon processes, the processes of debate, conflict, opposition and change, and that as a normal concomitant of these processes and free society, crisis was to be considered the norm of American society.

Francis W. Coker, in the March, 1953 edition of the APSR, continued the concern with the liberal tradition in his article, "Some Present-Day Critics of Liberalism."⁴² Noting that the constant concern since the ancient data of liberalism had been the deliverance from "unnatural and intolerable restraints on man," ⁴³ and that the specific social transformations sought by liberals had changed as the denials of freedom had changed, Coker described two general modern schools of criticism of the liberal faith.

The first group of critics specified by Coker was identified as the "majority school" democrats. Willmoore Kendall and J. Austin Ranney, noted as the two most noteworthy advocates of the school, are credited by Coker as arguing that there exist no absolute political rights, that liberalism wrongly interjects moral considerations into the realm of politics and, that democracy, according to Kendall and Ranney, is simply a form of government.

The second school of criticism, the "religious," Coker identifies with Reinhold Niebuhr. Niebuhr argues that the liberal conception of man as rational, reasonable, and therefore, capable of progress is a utopian illusion and that what is necessary to the resurrection of liberal thought was a spirit of realism regarding human limits. "The assumption of rationalists in the past centuries has been that either education or the equalization of economic interests would finally fashion the mind into a perfect instrument of universal and absolute knowledge and would ultimately destroy social friction by eliminating the partial perspectives which prompt men to assess social values in conflicting terms.

. . . at some point they will always accentuate social conflict by making men more stubborn in the defense of their interests, under the illusion that their interests represent universal values." ⁴⁴

In the June, 1955 edition of the Review, Cushing Strout, ⁴⁵ in "The 20th Century Enlightenment," argued that there had

occurred a role reversal between conservatives and liberals in the 20th century. While conservatives had become more sophisticated in using philosophical arguments to counter their liberal opponents, Strout argued that liberals had in fact abandoned traditional liberal ideas and had adopted the "progressive" mentality. These progressives, principally Thorsten Veblen, John Dewey, Carl Becker, and Charles Beard, advocated a new empiricism but, said Strout, they were in fact "committed to a utopian rationalism of their own."⁴⁶ The progressiveness paralleled the Enlightenment in their faith in progress and in their inability or refusal to see their own age in terms not historically continuous with the past and, paraphrasing Michael Oakeshott, Strout argued the progressive made the mistake of attributing to tradition the rigidity which really characterizes his own ideology of progress.⁴⁷

American liberalism, urged Strout, had always been free of the pretensions of the Enlightenment and had reduced its expectations regarding man, his reason, and the inevitability of progress. Its commitment had always been to formalism in the belief that constitutions and checks and balances would ensure the attainment of liberty. In the current century, scientific progress had seduced the liberals, causing them to reject formalism and to adopt a utopian posture. Believing this transformation to be in error, Strout concluded his

article by writing that ". . . it should be the special pride of liberalism that it alone puts its ultimate confidence in moral and legal procedures, not in pragmatic programs, in respect for democratic political institutions, not in dreams of a planned society, in the complexities of the historical sense, not in the simplicities of surrender to scientific progress." 48

In September, 1962, H. B. Mayo authored a short Review article entitled, "How Can We Justify Democracy" 49 in which he argued that political theory functions not only as an explanation of a political system but as a justification as well and then attempted to develop a justification for the democratic form.

There exist several possible justifications for democracy, wrote Mayo, the central principle of which is the institutionalization of popular control over the polity's policy makers. The first possible justificatory basis for democracy advanced by Mayo was to see its normative principles, political equality for example, as moral imperatives. Such an argument Mayo rejected because the self-evidence of the validity of moral principle such as equality was inconclusive. A second possible justification was by reference to the social and individual values, such as the peaceful adjustment of conflict, the orderly succession of rulers, and the minimization of coercion, realized in a democracy. This argument too was

In considering what has been said in the pages of the American Political Science Review about liberalism in the post-Mannheim era, it may be instructive to begin by noting that nowhere is that tradition expressly identified as an ideology. The eight articles which have been summarized in this paper thus far have presented divergent approaches to the analysis of the liberal-democratic position and yet none of those papers tended remotely towards a Mannheimian perspective or analysis of the genesis, substance, or internal logic of liberalism.

Mannheim, of course, in discussing liberal democracy as an ideal type of ideology, noted that, "the utopia of the liberal-humanitarian mentality is the 'idea'." ⁵² The idealistic philosophy of liberalism, according to Mannheim, established a rational conception of the world as it should be which served as the measuring rod by which the state of the world and the course of events could be measured and evaluated. Liberalism, wrote Mannheim, is the ". . . mode of thought which either does not see the elements in life and in thought which are based on will, interest, emotion, and Weltanschauung - or if it does recognize their existence, treats them as though they were equivalent to the intellect and believes that they may be mastered by and subordinated to reason." ⁵³

Mannheim further argued that the liberal-democratic ideology was the concomitant of bourgeois intellectualism

which demanded a scientific politics, a formal rationalization of the irrational elements and forces which composed the substance of politics. This formalism, as evidenced in its products of parliaments and electoral systems, attained, in Mannheim's words, "merely an apparent, formal intellectualization of the inherently irrational elements."⁵⁴ This "scientific" politics failed to see, according to Mannheim's analysis, that the emotional elements underlying a particular political position were inseparable from the rational presentations made in pursuit of the viewpoints' ends. Liberalism, rather, sought to separate the ends and means of political struggle and discourse by arriving at ends by what Mannheim termed theoretical means, e.g., parliamentary discussion. Liberalism, by its demand for rationalism, failed to see the collective forces behind every theory and political perspective. It thus was incapable of the insight that political discussion cannot be of a theoretical nature because every position advocated in such a discussion is based on particular socio-political interests.

Despite the failure of the articles herein reviewed to consciously approach the liberal tradition from a Mannheimian perspective, there are several themes of concurrence with Mannheim's thought on liberal ideology. The faith in, or at least the search for, a rational basis and justification for democracy was the purpose of a number of the authors

considered here. Pennock, it will be recalled, sought a "rational and empirical foundation"⁵⁵ for democratic theory.

A second thread apparent in the discussions of the liberal perspectives which have been considered here is an emphasis on form and process. Mannheim of course cited this feature of liberalism as a consequence of its utopian element, idealism. Because the protagonists of liberalism, the bourgeoisie, had adopted an idealistic philosophy for the purpose of overcoming and supplanting the clerical-theological view of the world, liberalism had "lost all sense for the material"⁵⁶ and had developed an emptiness of substantive content, a lack of concreteness and an emphasis on form. This abstractness was of course directly tied to the historical realities of the rise to power of the bourgeoisie and was indeed that which gave liberal-humanitarianism its drive.

Of particular interest and importance in the commentary on the subject of the liberal ideology in view of Mannheim's thought are the analyses of Easton and Whitaker. Both writers, Easton in connection with early critics of liberalism and Whitaker regarding the evolution of the advocacy of democracy in Latin America, noted the discrepancy in liberalism between theory and practice. Easton in particular argued that liberalism had failed to pursue its values because it had become identified with entrenched economic interests. From a Mannheimian perspective, it could be argued that the

historical phenomenon described and criticized by Easton and Whitaker represents the necessary dynamic of ideological thought. Seeking ascendancy, the interests of the middle class focused its intellectual concern on equality and liberty as the optimum operational principles of society. Once having attained social dominance, however, the thought of the middle class became ideological in the sense that it prevented the realization that its achievement of power had changed the socio-historical condition of the environment so that the values of equality and liberty were no longer applicable but were now mutually exclusive.

Despite this hint of Mannheimian analysis, however, the thought of American political scientists cannot be seen to any degree to have been influenced by Mannheim or to have independently arrived at a similar perspective or understanding of ideology in the abstract sense or of liberalism.

Two other ideal-types of ideology about which Mannheim wrote have been considered in the APSR during the time frame here under discussion and it may be of some advantage to consider those two manifestations of ideology, the conservative and the socialist-communist, in the same manner as that extended to liberalism.

In 1954, Henry A. Kissinger, in an article entitled, "The Conservative Dilemma: Reflections on the Political Thought of Metternich,"⁵⁷ argued that conservatism is an anomaly in a

revolutionary period. "Were society still cohesive, it would occur to no one to be a conservative for a serious alternative to the existing structure would be inconceivable." ⁵⁸ But revolution is a symptom of the expiration of self-evident social goals, wrote Kissinger, and an adjustment of the revolutionary forces within the existing system is impossible for what is at issue is the system itself. Thus, ". . . political contests turn doctrinal instead of empirical." ⁵⁹

There are two alternative conservative reactions to revolution, argued Kissinger: the historical conservatism of Burke in which revolution is seen as a violation of social morality and of history, and the rationalist conservatism of Metternich wherein revolution is perceived to be violative of reason. Rationalist conservatism, in Kissinger's view, combats revolution as preventing the implementation of universal social maxims by using the ideals of the Enlightenment against the revolutionary currents produced by the Enlightenment. According to Kissinger, Metternich saw that "philosophy was the only means of rescuing universality from (the) contingent claims" ⁶⁰ or revolution. Under the assumptions of the Enlightenment, truth is knowable and becomes evident through law and it is through the mechanism of the political that equilibrium is achieved. The conservative dilemma which Kissinger perceived in the position of the rationalist conservatism of Metternich is "that it is the task of the conservative not to defeat but

to forestall revolutions, that a society which cannot prevent a revolution. . . will not be able to defeat it by conservative means." ⁶¹

The development of conservatism was also the theme in 1954 of Sheldon S. Wolin's article, "Hume and Conservatism." ⁶² Hume, wrote Wolin, had a lasting influence on both liberalism and conservatism. Hume's was a distinctive conservatism according to Wolin because it was based on a "peculiar relationship with the Enlightenment." ⁶³ Hume's conservatism was grounded on the analytical tools of the Enlightenment but used against it. Reason, concluded Hume, was a functional process which served as the tool of human passions. Needs were productive of society and of government and man's institutions were merely artificial contrivances designed to address problems. These institutions developed over time and could not be understood without a sense of time and history. Time according to Hume was experience and experience implied the gradualism characteristic of the conservative ethos.

The conservatism of Hume, concluded Wolin, was superceded by that of later conservatives reacting to the metaphysics and transcendental norms of revolutionaries. His was the product of his particular time in that it was an attempt to preserve the gains achieved during the previous century of English history.

Samuel P. Huntington, in "Conservatism as an Ideology" ⁶⁴ in the June, 1957 edition of the APSR, argued that there

exist three broad and conflicting conceptions of the nature of conservatism as an ideology, ideology being defined as "a system of ideas concerned with the distribution of political and social values and acquiesced in by a significant social group." ⁶⁵ These three conceptions were identified by Huntington as the "aristocratic" theory, wherein conservatism is conceived to be the ideology of a single specific and unique historical movement, the "autonomous" theory, in which conservatism is seen not to be identified with a particular socio-historical environment but is rather an "autonomous system of ideas which are generally valid," ⁶⁶ and the "situational" theory, in which conservatism is postulated to be an "ideology arising out of a distinct but recurring type of historical situation in which a fundamental challenge is directed at established institutions and in which supporters of those institutions employ the conservative ideology...." ⁶⁷

The three distinct conceptions agree as to the substantive content of conservatism, wrote Huntington, but differ in respect to the relation of the conservative ideology to the historical process. With this in mind, Huntington argues that it is the situational theory which is the most satisfactory explanation of the genesis of conservatism for "The historical function of conservatism must be derived from its substance. That theory of conservatism is to be preferred which most adequately and completely explains the manifestation in

history of the Burkean ideology." ⁶⁸

"The essence of conservatism," wrote Huntington, "is the rationalization of existing institutions in terms of history, God, nature and man." ⁶⁹ It is a positional ideology, reflective not of the interests of particular social groups but of the relations between groups. As such its character is dependent upon "the changing external environment of a group rather than its permanent internal characteristics." ⁷⁰

In contrast to the treatment which the liberal ideology has received in the APSR, conservatism appears to have been seen in a more Mannheimian manner by American political scientists. First, in accord with Mannheim's conclusion, both Kissinger and Huntington argue that conservatism develops not as an autonomous body of political thought but rather as a reaction to liberalism and revolution. "The manifestations of conservatism," wrote Huntington, "are simply parallel ideological reactions to similar situations." ⁷¹

Mannheim, in his discussion of conservative historicism, argued that this type of ideology, as contrasted to liberalism, was fully aware of the irrational element of politics and that the conservative saw reason as being incapable of dealing with that element. Conservatism, wrote Mannheim, is concerned with history as the "reign of pre- and super-rational forces." ⁷² The conservative mentality, is in harmony with the given reality of society and history and

develops its "idea" of the good in an ex post facto fashion when forced into the arena of ideas by the liberal attack. For the conservative, in Mannheim's view, the past is the creator of all value and reality, i.e., the present, is the embodiment of the highest value.

In addition to the agreement between these authors and Mannheim as pertaining to the developmental feature of the conservative ideology, the apperception of conservative ideology as a perspective internally coherent and valid for its own purposes, as an "ideology" in Mannheimian terms, is more apparent than was the thought of those authors who considered liberalism.

This concurrence in attitudes of perspectives between American political scientists and Mannheim occurs as well when the ideology of socialism is considered. In the Contemporary Doctrine of the Soviet State and Its Philosophical Foundations,"⁷³ Vernon V. Aspaturian raised the issue of what he conceived to be the contemporary repudiation of the Marxist theory of the state in the Soviet Union.

The classical Marxist position described the state as being proof of the existence of classes and as a tool of oppression. The failure of the state to die away was a problem for mid-20th century Marxists and, to Aspaturian, illustrated the transmutation of Marxist political theory.

Under Stalin, according to Aspaturian, the Soviet Union was conceived and presented as a state de novo not contemplated

by previous Marxist categories. This "transformation of the Soviet State," wrote Aspaturian, "implicitly required equally fundamental alterations in the basic dogma of Marxism, dialectical and historical materialism, upon which rested the now-repudiated Marxist theory of the state."⁷⁴ Since the sociological, economic, and political categories of Marxist ideology were interdependent, a repudiation of one necessitated a revision in all others and a new philosophical and epistemological foundation.

Marx, wrote Aspaturian, had perceived the motive force in historical progression to be a balance between determinism, extant in the capitalist period, and voluntarism, which would take precedence in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods. "Unlike Hegel, Marx did not purport to rationalize an existing social order. . . . The absence of an ideological function (in the Mannheim sense) distinguished Marx from both Hegel and Stalin."⁷⁵ Hegel's dialectic exalted the state whereas Marx utilized but inverted the dialectic to denounce the state. Stalin, argued Aspaturian, used both, Hegelian categories to justify the Soviet state and Marxist structures to analyze and denounce the bourgeois world.

Stalin transformed Marxism from determinism to voluntaristic categories in what was termed the "second revolution" of 1930-1935 when he advanced the explanation that the events of that period constituted revolution from above,

i.e., that the "external world can be forcibly adjusted by ideas conceived by man." ⁷⁶ The argument that the economic substructure of society can be overturned without a corresponding alteration in the political superstructure was theoretically inconsistent, noted Aspaturian, since in traditional Marxist terms revolution from above is possible only in a classless society whereas the purpose of the "second revolution" was the elimination of a particular economic class.

The turn to a voluntarist perspective, postulating the supremacy of the will over fact, was, according to Aspaturian, to be used to rationalize all future changes in the Soviet Union and to solidify the Stalinist power structure. "Although the theory of 'controlled revolution' is an inaccurate conceptualization of the past action, resting as it does upon distorted, falsified, or fabricated history, it is designed as a philosophical rationalization not so much of the past as of the future." ⁷⁷

Aspaturian concludes his analysis by stating that "Marxist-Leninism in the USSR has been converted from a revolutionary-disintegrative doctrine into a rationalizing-integrative system, or to use the special terminology of Karl Mannheim, has made the transition from utopia to ideology." ⁷⁸

The final article to be considered here is "The Communist Doctrine of the Inevitability of War," ⁷⁹ authored by Frederic S. Burin in the June, 1963 edition of the APSR. In the article

Burin argued that the alterations which had occurred in the official Soviet position on the theoretical inevitability of war since 1917 were illustrative of the "transformation of theory into ideology." ⁸⁰

These transformations had occurred as early as the New Economic Plan period under Lenin. "When the revolution failed to develop in the West . . . , Lenin adopted the policy which Stalin later sloganized as Socialism in one country." ⁸¹ This coexistence, according to Burin, was a grudging acceptance of political fact by Lenin rather than a propaganda ploy.

Stalin's theory of capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union, too, was in Burin's argument a conscious device to meet the ideological needs of Russian domestic and foreign policies. Contemporaneously, the thesis revealed at the 20th Party Congress that war was not inevitable "appears to be an obvious adjustment of ideology to the concrete requirement of political strategy and propaganda." ⁸²

Noting that the polemical debate on the issue of the inevitability of war is one of the signal elements in the ideological conflict of the Sino-Soviet split, Burin concludes his article by stating "When those in power take hold of a theory. . . theory degenerates into justification. It loses its critical character, becomes apologetic, becomes, that is, ideology." ⁸³

The adherence of the perspectives outlined above, both explicitly and implicitly, to that of Mannheim is interesting and provides an indication of the status of the concept of ideology in and its meaning for American political science.

It should not be surprising that American political science has viewed the liberal tradition in a manner different from the level of analysis with which it has addressed more "alien" political perspectives. It is understandable that, given the liberal tradition of the United States, participants in that tradition should derive their perspectives from its values and assumptions. Indeed, if we follow Mannheim, such an adherence is necessary for, as Mannheim argued, social science must be concerned with objects having meaning and value and an understanding of those objects can only be achieved through the categories of the observer's own mental structures and values.

The inability of American political science to subject the liberal-democratic tradition to the same modes of analysis as it brings to bear on conservatism or socialism, however, has an important implication for the discipline and for the understanding of the concept of ideology. That is, that American political science has developed a view of ideology which corresponds to Mannheim's "particular" conception of the phenomenon. It will be recalled that Mannheim argued that, by the particular conception, ideas were conceived to be a

function of existence, that social conditions and the interests of the possessor of a political perspective had to be analyzed and determined to discover what was meant by his assertions. In utilizing a particular conception of ideology, American political science is assuming that its tradition, the liberal, and other ideologies share a common system of values and that the disparities between the liberal and other points of view rest not upon distinct value systems and mind-sets but rather on conscious or unconscious deceptions on the part of opponents. Given the validity of Mannheim's analysis, the failure of American political science to recognize the necessity for a total conception of ideology militates against the possibility of the discipline advancing beyond either a normative position, which, given an understanding that all points of view are partial and that all values are valid only within the context of that perspective, must be seen as polemical, or a particular conception of ideology, capable of criticizing or unmasking other ideologies but incapable in and of itself of serving as the basis for a more comprehensive understanding or theory of ideology.

CHAPTER III

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY

. . . Few concepts in social analysis have inspired such a mass of commentary, yet few have stimulated the production of so little cumulative knowledge about society and politics. ⁸⁴

Writing in the American Political Science Review in 1971, Robert D. Putnam, in his study of the "elite political culture" and its manifestation of ideological thought and behavior, reached the above-quoted conclusion regarding the use of the concept of ideology in the literature of political science.

A review of the articles published in the APSR since 1936, the year of the appearance in the United States of Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia, leads one to a conclusion not dissimilar from that reached by Putnam and Giovanni Sartori, who noted that the growing popularity of the use of the term ideology in the discipline was matched by the increasing obscurity of the concept. ⁸⁵

To what can this confusion be ascribed? Certainly, ideology as a conceptualization has been the subject of a great deal of thought and scholarly comment. As has been seen in considering the thought of American political science on specific ideologies, however, a confusion exists in the

discipline and that lack of coherence seemingly likewise exists when the term ideology in the abstract is considered.

It may be instructive to consider whether there exists any motif in the works in the Review regarding ideology, whether there are any concurrences between these works and the thought of Karl Mannheim and whether there is a necessary relationship between the bias which has been discovered in the attitude of American political science towards ideologies and its attitude toward the concept of ideology.

An integral feature of Karl Mannheim's thought on ideology and on politics was his position concerning the evaluative element of thought and political behavior. As explicated by Louis Wirth in his preface to the 1936 English language edition of Ideology and Utopia, Mannheim argued that "since every assertion of a 'fact' about the social world touches the interests of some individual or group, one cannot even call attention to the existence of certain 'facts' without counting the objections of those whose very raison d'etre in society rests upon a divergent interpretation of the 'factual' situation." 86

For Mannheim, then, interest, generated for a class out of its socio-historical environment, is the genesis of action, the purpose of which is to maintain or alter the cultural setting. It is interest and its result, action, which are the sources of intellectual activity by focusing the intellect of the group. As summarized by Wirth in his commentary,

". . . those basic impulses which have been generally designated as 'interests' actually are the forces which at the same time generate the ends of our practical activity and focus our intellectual attention." ⁸⁷ Rather than being based in a contemplative and objective relationship with the world, then, thought is the result of "a volitional and emotional-unconscious undercurrent." ⁸⁸

It is this interest-bound and socio-historically determined nature of political thought and behavior which of course, in Mannheim's view, causes knowledge in the social sciences to be of a qualitatively different type from that in the natural sciences. ". . . the principal propositions of the social sciences are neither mechanistically external nor formal, nor do they represent purely quantitative correlations," wrote Mannheim, "but rather situational diagnoses in which we use, by and large, the same concepts and thought-models which were created for activist purposes in real life." ⁸⁹ The comprehension of reality and of truth, argued Mannheim, could not be considered complete if the method of seeking knowledge was restricted to the methods, and the underlying assumptions, of naturalistic science. Positivistic thought, in Mannheim's view, abjured the qualitative aspect of thought and behavior but since evaluation was the root element in political activity its negation as a valuable subject of study by the modern rationalist perspective had negated political thought

as a viable discipline.

The view that the negation of value as an element in the study of political thought and behavior was an egregious error as expressed by Mannheim in Ideology and Utopia has been shared by several commentators in the American Political Science Review since the publication of Mannheim's work. In the August, 1944 edition of the APSR, John H. Hollowell raised the question of whether political science is or should be a science.⁹⁰ Noting the positivistic trend in American political science, Hollowell asked "have we been travelling the right road in seeking to 'emancipate' ourselves?"⁹¹ from normative concepts in addressing political behavior. The success of the natural sciences, wrote Hollowell, has led us to seek similar success in the study of man and we have assumed that the bases of success in the sciences, experimental methodology and inductive logic, can serve as the bases of a science of politics.

Hollowell questioned the value of positivism as applied to the study of man and his social and political life. The perspective of positivism is not a sufficiently adequate one from which to observe and understand political phenomena, he wrote, since by ruling out values as objective truths as positivism must, much that is valuable, if not essential, to the understanding of political process and behavior is lost.⁹²

Further, argued Hollowell, positivism does engage in the metaphysical speculation it claims to avoid by assuming certain

premises such as the existence of an order of nature, the existence of truth, and the reality of causation, premises which in Hollowell's view are beyond proof. "Positivism," he wrote, "can achieve meaning for the facts which it describes only by engaging in the kind of metaphysical speculation it denounces; or it can insist . . . that the fact have no meaning." ⁹³

Additionally, according to Hollowell, the positivist conception sees politics as being concerned with the struggle of individual or collective wills for power and that political philosophy is a rationalization of that struggle, a provision of "good reasons" for the "real" reasons behind the clash of interests. If this conception is true, stated Hollowell, then political study must be concerned with purpose, aims, and objectives, all value-laden concepts, for power is a relational concept, existing only in action, which necessarily involves purpose.

Gabriel A. Almond, writing in the April, 1946 edition of the Review in an article entitled "Politics, Science, and Ethics," ⁹⁴ addressed many of the same issues as had Hollowell in his 1944 article. Those in American political science, products of what Almond called "scientificism," who urged that the discipline should leave questions of ethics to the philosophers, had as their intent the view that the political scientist should have no ethical purpose animating his work. Those who advocate this view, according to Almond, assume that

man is irrational and therefore incapable of ethical conduct.

In Almond's view, the proof of the fallacy of this perspective is possible through the demonstration of the ability of man to achieve "substantial rationality," that is the ability to define and determine values, the "use of intelligent choice in the determination of the ends of action."⁹⁵ According to Almond, rational judgment is possible when the individual is possessed of "emotional clarity," i.e., not laboring under a psychological compulsion, when the correct data concerning the objective context in which the contemplated action is to take place are available, and when the individual possesses the necessary skills of analysis and interpretation.⁹⁶

Almond went on to argue the relationship of ethics to political science. "Science cannot create values,"⁹⁷ stated Almond. These grow out of the needs and aspirations of people. And, since public policy is the primary datum of political science and the purpose of public policy is to meet the needs of the people, the function of political science is an ethical one.

In "Beyond Relativism in Political Theory,"⁹⁸ a 1947 Review article by Arnold Brecht, a roundtable discussion featuring a number of prominent American political scientists including Francis W. Coker, Eric Voegelin, John H. Hollowell, J. Roland Pennock and Gabriel A. Almond was reviewed. The premise of the discussion was the position that modern science

and scientific methods had led to an "ethical vacuum"⁹⁹ in the study of politics and man because of the relativist position that no scientific method has yet been devised which is capable of determining the superiority of any purposes in absolute terms.

It was the general agreement of the discussion that the scientific proof of the superiority of certain values in political matters was an impossibility but Gabriel Almond was credited with advancing an argument which met with approbation that the scientific method of approach to political subjects had made a significant contribution in its "hypothesis that political as well as other values are to be understood not only as objective goals and purposes, but also in terms of their subjective relationships."¹⁰⁰

There is, then, a strain in American political science as evidenced in the pages of the Review which has seen, as did Mannheim, the essentiality of perceiving and understanding the evaluative element in political behavior. This concurrence is, however, a superficial one. The understanding that American political scientists have of the nature of value is far removed from Mannheim's conception. Whereas Mannheim's entire schema argued that value was the essence of politics and that a science of politics was impossible without accounting for the socially-determined differences in value, the thrust of his sociology of knowledge was based on the position that a given value was not absolute and could not be

considered to be an objective entity. The implication of the thoughts of Hollowell and Almond in particular indicate that the attitude towards the nature of political value current in American political science is far different. Hollowell, as has been seen, argues that political study must be concerned with value-laden concepts in order to be relative. Yet Hollowell seems to argue that values should be seen as 'objective truths'. Similarly, Almond urged that political science come to the view that man is capable of 'substantive reason,' a reason capable of divining transcendent values.

In this view, the practitioners of normative political science fall victim to what Mannheim argued was the problem of the 'sphere of truth as such,' an outcome of the modern dualistic world view which posited the existence of eternal verities. A certain segment of American political science has, then, recognized the inability of positivistic-behavioralist science to adequately comprehend the vital element of political behavior which is value but yet has been incapable of going beyond identifying with and being the proponent of a certain set of values which it sees as being absolute and transcendent. American political science has thus been unable to advance beyond what Mannheim termed a "relativist" position and to achieve the intellectual synthesis which would through Mannheim's theory enable political science to truly comprehend values and to use value in other than an ideological manner

in understanding political motivation and behavior.

In addition to these articles and to a series of later works which sought to address the question of the definition of the term "ideology," there have appeared a number of articles which, from a variety of seemingly unrelated perspectives, have sought to consider ideology. Of these eight articles, the first, that by Barrington Moore,¹⁰¹ seems to achieve a decidedly Mannheimian perspective as it pertains to the interrelationship of thought and the objective socio-economic world which thought seeks to comprehend. Indeed, Moore seems to go beyond Mannheim in arguing that there exists a self-corrective mechanism in thought by which adjustments can be made to more realistically encompass change in the objective world.

The theme of thought-patterns, or ideologies, as they exist in a particular environment and are impacted upon by factors in that environment is apparent as well in two other articles now to be considered. H. Arthur Steiner's work concerning the ideology of the Communist Chinese offers a conclusion in the form of a warning to outside observers to the effect that that ideology to be understood must be accepted in terms of its own internal logic and perspectives.¹⁰² Zbigniew Brzezinski's study concerning what some projected to be the modifying impact of technology on totalitarian states as well urges the view that ideologies can only be truly

comprehended by understanding them on their own terms and that such an understanding demonstrates that extraneous influences cannot have the same effect upon them as those influences have on other perspectives. ¹⁰³

Another theme consistent with the Mannheimian approach, that of the necessary identification of a political perspective with a philosophical one, was the subject of Hans Kelsen's article. ¹⁰⁴ That Kelsen failed in his demonstration is argued by Felix Oppenheim in the subsequent article. ¹⁰⁵ However, the insight that there exists such an organic relationship between political thought and philosophy is certainly one with which Mannheim was in accord and is indicative of a fruitful subject for political science to pursue.

The last articles to be considered in this section have important relevance for a Mannheimian approach to ideology and to an understanding of the current state of the study of that phenomenon in the discipline in this nature. Herbert McCloskey's article concerning the psychological correlates of conservatism is one of several such analyses which have appeared in the Review seeking to identify conservative political sentiments with an individual's psychological profile. ¹⁰⁶ As was argued in Mannheim, however, such an attempt to explain political behavior fails to consider the sociological genesis of political thought. Such a perspective

is the result of the epistemological school dominant in the discipline today which emphasizes the mechanistic aspects of behavior. It is, as Mannheim argued, incapable of adequately explaining political phenomena. The second article referred to here, that of Christian Bay, articulated this conclusion concerning the inability of modern political science to adequately understand political behavior. ¹⁰⁷

Barrington Moore, Jr., in his article, "The Influence of Ideas on Policies As Shown in the Collectivization of Agriculture in Russia," in the August, 1947 edition of the American Political Science Review concerned himself with what he termed "one of the major controversial question in the social sciences," ¹⁰⁸ the question of the relationship between ideas and political change.

In analyzing the interaction between the positions adopted by the government of the Soviet Union and the course of events in the effort to collectivize Soviet agriculture, Moore developed five propositions or hypotheses concerning the dynamic relationship between ideas and public policies. In proposition one, Moore noted that the historic experience of a social group provides a series of formulae or stereotypes through which political and economic tensions are interpreted. Out of these interpretations, according to Moore's proposition two, there develop a series of goals or ways of dealing with these tensions. It is these goals and their underlying analyses

which form the elements of political programs or ideologies. In proposition three, Moore argued that when a program of goals is put into practice, new tensions and problems are generated and the effort to respond to these tensions is likely to result in a modification of the original set of goals. Within certain groups, however, according to Moore's fourth proposition, continuity of leadership and indoctrination of group membership leads to a stability or rigidity of goals and analyses. Under these conditions, the tendency is to meet new situations with old ideas and responses and to thereby limit the range of possible adaptations. According to the fifth and last of Moore's hypotheses, the course leading either to retention or modification of the group's goals, analyses, and behaviors is dependent upon which course will result in the strengthening of its power position. If modification of its program is necessary to solidify its dominance, then modification will be effected. If modification will result in a diminution of its position, then reversion to its earlier ideology will take place.

Hans Kelsen, writing in the October, 1948 edition of the APSR, sought to prove "that there exists an external parallelism, and perhaps also an inner relationship, between politics and other parts of philosophy such as epistemology, that is, theory of knowledge, and theory of values." 109

In "Absolutism and Relativism in Philosophy and Politics," Kelsen argued that the antagonism between philosophical

absolutism and relativism was analogous and possibly related to the antagonism between autocracy, political absolutism, and democracy, political relativism. Describing the parallel between philosophic and political absolutism, Kelsen wrote, "The relationship between the object of knowledge, the absolute, and the subject of knowledge, the individual human being, is quite similar to that between an absolute government and its subjects. Just as the unlimited power of this government is beyond any influence on the part of its subjects, who are bound to obey laws without participating in their creation, the absolute is beyond our experience, and the object of knowledge - in the theory of philosophic absolutism - independent of the subject of knowledge, totally determined in his cognition by heteronomous laws." ¹¹⁰

Counterposed to the absolutist position, in Kelsen's view, are the common principles of philosophic and political relativism. Just as the individual in democracy is free to participate in the creation of the political order, so is the knowing subject in relativistic epistemology autonomous in the process of cognition. Freedom of both choice and cognition and equality in the pursuit of political ends and of knowledge are the common principles of relativistic philosophy and democracy.

But beyond these parallels which Kelsen termed as external, he perceived what might be termed as an organic relationship. Absolutism in the political sphere, wrote Kelsen, has a

tendency to use absolute philosophical principles and perspectives as ideological instruments, whether by ascribing to itself the role of the agent of the absolute philosophical principles or by absolutizing those values into the basis of the state. A contrary tendency permeates the relativistic perspectives in that in the case where it is believed that absolute truth and knowledge are impossible, it is necessary to assume that no one party has the logical right to impose its will on principles on others. "That value judgments have only relative validity," wrote Kelsen, ". . . implies that opposite value judgments are neither logically nor morally impossible." 111

In 1950, in the December issue of the APSR, Felix Oppenheim authored the article, "Relativism, Absolutism, and Democracy," the point of which was to address the argument, advanced in the 1948 Hans Kelsen article previously cited, to the effect that there exists at least a parallel if not a necessary connection between the philosophical and political perspectives in absolutism and relativism.

In attempting to refute Kelsen's conclusion, Oppenheim argues that there exist four possible linkages between philosophic principles and political predispositions. One possible connection, stated Oppenheim, is a logical one, whereby it could be demonstrated that there is a necessary progression between a certain epistemological theory and a

political doctrine. Oppenheim denies the existence of such a linkage by arguing that philosophical absolutism maintains that there exists some value judgment which is universally valid but that absolutism as a generic description of a perspective does not specify any exact identity of the absolute value and that therefore it does not logically or necessarily argue for either absolutism or democracy in political matters.

Similarly, Oppenheim contends that many like Kelsen have identified philosophical empiricism with democracy because both processes utilize a form of scientific method to arrive at their conclusions. Oppenheim argued that this perceived parallel is not a demonstration of a logical necessity uniting empiricism with democracy since, in Oppenheim's view, autocratic or absolute politics utilize empirical methods to the same degree as do democracies to determine the best means to achieve their ends.

The second possible linkage which Oppenheim explored is a political one. Does there exist, wrote Oppenheim, an "empirical law of a political character connecting empiricism and democracy"? ¹¹² According to some, an empiricist must be a democrat since society must be democratic to be able to arrive at truth through the free exchange of information and ideas. Conversely, noted Oppenheim, some argue that there exists a political connection between philosophical and political absolutism since the discovery and retention of

absolute truth can only be hindered by the free exchange of erroneous ideas. Therefore, philosophic absolutism favors absolute government which denies free opinion and which advances absolute values. As to this linkage, Oppenheim refutes any such necessary connection. An empiricist, in his view, must prefer democracy only if he believes knowledge to be the highest social goal. Should the empiricist believe that another goal supercedes the goal of empirical truth, then it is possible for him to adhere to absolutist political forms and principles. Alternatively, it is just as possible for a philosophical absolutist to favor democratic forms if the absolute values he maintains are that the tenets of democracy are absolutely valid assertions.

The third and fourth linkages which Oppenheim explored were the psychological and the historical, both of which he rejects by indicating that states of mind have no necessary identification with either absolutism or relativism in the political sphere and that historical experience has shown that preferences for either democracy or absolutism have been maintained by men of both philosophical persuasions.

H. Arthur Steiner, in his article "Current 'Mass Line' Tactics in Communist China," which appeared in the June 1951 Review, raised the issue of the precept of the unity of theory and practice in classical Marxist-Leninism. Defining mass line tactics as a design "to effect that relationship between the

Party and the masses best calculated to enable the revolutionary leadership to capture mass support for its program,"¹¹³

Steiner indicated that the Chinese Communist Party leaders attributed their revolutionary success to effective mass line tactics and believed that the continuation of the technique was a prerequisite to the consolidation of their power.

In Steiner's view, the use of mass line techniques was calculated to close domestic political gaps and to deflect actual and potential sources of threat to the Communist leadership. However, Steiner continued in the form of a caveat, the dismissal of the mass line doctrine as propagandistic sloganeering should not be made easily. Marxist-Leninism, he warned, cannot separate propaganda from action or action from theory. Mass line tactics are intrinsic to Marxist ideology and although they may appear inconsistent to the liberal observer, from a Marxist-Leninist perspective they are wholly understandable and logical.

The focus of Zbigniew Brzezinski's "Totalitarianism and Rationality," which was published in the September, 1956 edition of the APSR, was the question of whether the modern totalitarian state would necessarily evolve into a more democratic state through the "irresistible influence of rationality inherent in the bureaucratic and managerial apparatus that no modern state can do without."¹¹⁴

Brzezinski in his analysis argued that totalitarianism was not incompatible with the rationalistic orientation of the

modern state and that despite the reality that policy in a totalitarian state was based on technical expertise (i.e., rationality), the fact that modern totalitarian states were an historically distinct form of the genus "dictatorship," primarily in their efforts to eliminate existing social groups and institutions, to institutionalize the revolution rather than to associate with previously existing socio-political forces, argued against the ameliorating effects of rational modes of organization and policy. The modern totalitarian state, wrote Brzezinski, attempts to transform society to an ideological model and its use of the technical and rational instruments of power by a centralized leadership is without restraint for the purpose of total social revolution, including the conditioning of man on the basis of ideology.

On the basis of his analysis, Brzezinski drew two conclusions. First, because of the ideological goal-orientation of totalitarian states, that orientation will direct the rational, bureaucratic tendencies of the state rather than being influenced by them. And, continued Brzezinski, once the revolution is institutionalized and human behavior is oriented to the socially-engineered ideological goal, then it makes no difference whether society is directed by "revolutionaries or by scientific Ph.D.'s." ¹¹⁵ Secondly, for rationalistic tendencies to affect the totalitarian mind

and state, it would be necessary for the state to experience the "withdrawal of commitment to total social and economic engineering" ¹¹⁶ and to grant to the populace the opportunity of choice of ends not sanctioned by the state's ideological goal. Given his perception that there appears no such future prospect, Brzezinski concluded that the rationalist tomorrow does not foresee the end of totalitarianism and the fruition of democracy but rather only a further stage in totalitarian dynamics.

Herbert McCloskey, in a March, 1958 Review article entitled "Conservatism and Personality" explored the psychological correlates of certain types of political attitudes and behavior. Starting with the point that "there is considerable regularity and coherence . . . in the relation between certain casts of character and personality on the one side and the degree of conservatism or liberalism expressed on the other," ¹¹⁷ McCloskey proceeded, by use of a questionnaire scale, the key items of which were based on the tenets of Burkean conservative philosophy, to arrive at a description of the conservative personality.

On the basis of his survey and an analysis of its results, McCloskey concluded that conservatives were generally possessed of a lower intelligence and education than liberals, and displayed "undesirable" social/psychological and clinical/psychological attributes. From these findings, McCloskey

concluded that "support for conservative doctrines is highly correlated with certain distinct personality patterns" and "that most of the propositions fundamental to the conservative creed . . . are in reality normative rather than empirical statements." 118

In June, 1964, Herbert McCloskey authored another article in the American Political Science Review addressed to the question as to whether the truism that consensus is necessary for the viability of democracy was empirically valid. McCloskey's study, published under the title "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," 119 intended to answer the questions of whether the American electorate was divided on the fundamental questions of democratic values and procedures, whether the understanding of political matters was too rudimentary to be considered an ideology, whether popular support for general abstractions about democracy was greater than for specific applications or those ideas, and whether the constituent ideas of American democratic ideology were held principally by "influentials" and whether those influentials exhibit a greater consensus on democratic values than the general populace.

For the purpose of his survey study, McCloskey defined ideology as "an elaborately defined theory, a body of interrelated assumptions, axioms, and principles and a set of ideals that serve as a guide for action." 120 Given this

definition, which McCloskey advanced as being reflective of general agreement in the discipline, American democracy could be considered as an ideology.

McCloskey's findings were numerous, among them being the facts that there exists a consensus among the influentials on the democratic "rules of the game," a consensus not extant among the general populace, that neither the influential nor the general segments of the polity reflected a consensus on certain "equalitarian" principles of democracy, and that there existed among the influentials but not in the general populace a consensus on attitudes of efficacy toward public affairs.

On the basis of his findings, McCloskey arrived at five conclusions regarding ideology and consensus in the American democracy. First, American politics is non-ideological only if one considers the general population. Influentials, or the politically articulate, are highly ideological. Second, the homogeneity of the elite stratum of American society militates towards their ideological consensus. Third, this consensus is far from perfect, being flawed in a number of attitudes. Fourth, the lack of consensus in the general population and its imperfect nature among the elite indicates that consensus is not a critical attribute of democracy. Fifth, McCloskey speculates that political scientists are biased toward intellectual factors in their analyses of the political process and system.

The critical issue of the validity of the behavioralist movement and its effect on American political science was the subject of Christian Bay's March, 1965 Review article, "Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literature." Quoting Alfred Cobban, Bay noted that political science was "a device, invented by university teachers, for avoiding that dangerous subject politics, without achieving science." ¹²¹ The root cause of this state, argued Bay, was the behavioralist trend in political science, a trend which Bay critiqued by stating that "much of current work on political behavior generally fails to articulate its very real value biases, and that the political impact of this supposedly neutral literature is generally conservative and in a special sense anti-political." ¹²²

Behavioral definitions, according to Bay, are too restrictive. What is necessary is a more responsible theoretical framework to guide empirical research, a framework made responsible by including some conception of human value and public good. Such a perspective would actually address political matters, those concerned with retaining or altering socio-political conditions and with satisfying human needs rather than what Bay described as the focus of behavioralism, the "pseudopolitical."

Behavioral research, admitted Bay, was competent in observing the canons of formal rationality but failed to

comprehend "substantive" rationality, that mode of thought addressed to the issues of commitment and the "ought" of politics. This failure contained the danger of exposing anti-political bias in political science in that politics would have to be rejected as a value instrument of reason dedicated to the improvement of society and man.

What was necessary, concluded Bay, was the "expansion and more systematic articulation of the psychological and the normative perspectives of political behavior research. I propose as a normative basis the proposition that politics exist for the purpose of progressively removing the most stultifying obstacles to a free human development...." ¹²³

Within the last ten years in particular there has appeared in the Review a series of articles the basic premise of which has been a consensus on the necessity for considering ideology a critical conceptual construct in the study of political matters and the need for refining the parameters and meaning of the term to enhance its utility. It is most instructive to consider what the discipline has had to say about the concept of ideology. The epistemological bias of American political science becomes apparent in these articles and, with that bias, the lack of success in adequately comprehending the phenomenon of ideology.

Harry Eckstein, writing as a rapporteur on a conference of political scientists, raised the issue of the utility of

political philosophy in his June, 1956 Review article, "Political Theory and the Study of Politics: A Report of a Conference." 124

It was Eckstein's conclusion that the conferees had achieved a consensus of opinion on the position that the history of political thought had been informative on a matter of central importance to political science, the issue of political ideologies. Political activities and political attitudes, it was argued, are inseparably related aspects of the same phenomena and that "the way in which they (men) view the world and the way in which they translate their world-views into political 'directives' are absolutely fundamental to the correct analysis of political behavior." 125

Despite this consensus, however, Eckstein reported that the conferees were unable to resolve the question of whether highly refined and articulated ideologies were actually and accurately reflective of the popular ideologies which were the motive forces in men's behavior and in history. There was agreement on a related question, however, that being that "probably all political philosophies reflect popular ideology and that the consciousness of even the most free-floating intellectual is conditioned by the consciousness of his society." 126 It was noted by Eckstein that the conferees agreed that ideology was an area of study in which behavioralists and political philosophers could profitably coordinate their

research and analytical efforts.

In the September, 1965 Review, James B. Christoph authored the first of several articles which sought to clarify the meaning and use of the term ideology for political science. ¹²⁷ "Consensus and Cleavage in British Political Ideology" considered "whether western societies are now approaching, or have reached, a condition called 'the end of ideology'." ¹²⁸ In his analysis of the question, Christoph concerned himself with the case of Great Britain and concluded that the answers to the questions of whether a nation's political environment was ideological and whether the West was experiencing an "end of ideology" were dependent upon one's definition of ideology.

If, wrote Christoph, one defines ideology as a Weltanschauung, as a comprehensive, consistent and closed system of knowledge, then Britain is a non-ideological polity. Ideology in this total sense, argued Christoph, is the product of certain social and historical conditions, specifically the upheaval of violent and concerted modernizations. It is the failure of political systems under conditions of modernization to meet the challenges of efficacy and legitimacy which is productive of ideology or Weltanschauung. British pragmatism and attachment to precedent have adequately coped with these conditions and have therefore precluded the development of ideology in Britain.

However, continued Christoph, if one defines ideology as an attitude structure, a generalized view of man with a normative content comprised of a series of separate but related attitudes which function to relate and give meaning to political events,¹²⁹ then Britain can be seen as an ideological environment. "If Britain lacks the normal concomitants of the politics of total ideology, she is not altogether free of the pull of ideology in the second sense. . . . The British political system manifests certain important beliefs which, though they do not add up to a Weltanschauung, nevertheless embody values and principles of action connected to larger views of man, society and the state."¹³⁰

In his analysis, Christoph fails to adequately answer the question which is implied in his opening presentation of the problem, e.g., what definition of the term "ideology" should the political scientist adopt if he is to use the term in a productive fashion. Moreover, Christoph is subject to a criticism from a Mannheimian-perspective on the nature of ideology. Christoph indicated that there are at least two mutually-exclusive definitions of ideology. It can be argued that Weltanschauung and attitude structure represent not antagonistic opposites but ends of a continuum and that the classification of one as a closed, refined system or as a generalized view depends not so much on different definitions but rather on the specific form which a particular ideology takes. That is, if Mannheim's commentary on the ideal types

of ideologies is recalled, one particular ideology, socialism-communism, seems to fit Christoph's Weltanschauung and others, principally liberalism, seem to accord with Christoph's findings regarding the ideology of Great Britain. Thus, simply, it can be argued from a Mannheimian perspective that Christoph's findings in the British polity represent not one definition of the term ideology but rather a manifestation of a particular type of ideology.

The March, 1966 edition of the APSR saw the publication of "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation" ¹³¹ by Joseph La Palombara, an article in which the author considered the "decline-of-ideology" school of thought and argued that the perception of such a decline was a distorted one brought on by what La Palombara described as a mode of thought which itself could only be considered as ideological.

The decline-of-ideology school has adopted "many of the undesirable earmarks of ideological conflict," ¹³² wrote La Palombara, intending as it does a pejorative connotation of the concept ideology through the use of the term to denote thought distorted as a result of subconscious forces or of conscious deception. Ideology properly considered, continued La Palombara, "involves a philosophy of history, a view of man's present place in it, some estimate of probable lines of future development and a set of prescriptions regarding how to hasten, retard, and or modify that developmental direction."¹³³

Ideology therefore may or may not be dogmatic, utopian, or flamboyantly rhetorical.

The error of the end-of-ideology school is that "what these writers mean by ideology is not any given set of values, beliefs, preferences, expectations and prescriptions regarding society but that particular set that we may variously associate with Orthodox Marxism, 'Scientific Socialism,' Bolshevism, Maoism, or in any case with strongly held and dogmatically articulated ideas regarding class conflict and revolution." 134

To limit the meaning of the concept of ideology to these categories and to equate changes in Marxist rhetoric and behavior with an end of ideological thought is, wrote La Palombara, "to narrow the meaning of the central concept to the point where it has very limited utility for the social scientist." 135

La Palombara concluded his article by arguing that the writers of the death-of-ideology school suffer from a simplified economic determinist perspective, seeing ideology as a product and function of the problems of industrialism and foreseeing its demise as economic well-being becomes widespread. In this view they are ideologically conditioned, according to the author, endeavoring to justify and protect their own economic and social position in the establishments of the developed Western nations.

What La Palombara seems to be arguing, put in Mannheimian terms, is that much of the literature which is presented in

terms of addressing the state of ideological thought and behavior is actually framed from the particular conception of ideology. Cognizant of Mannheim's broader conceptualization, then, La Palombara's characterization of this school of analysis as polemical would have to be judged valid.

However, La Palombara's low-level point having been agreed to, the question remains as to whether his argument that ideology is "properly considered" when the term is understood by the general definition he offers enhances the appreciation or utility of the concept. And, again, beyond the definitional problem, the question of how ideology impacts on political behavior and how that impact can be understood to advance a science of politics remains unconsidered by La Palombara.

Giovanni Sartori, writing in the June, 1969 edition of the American Political Science Review in an article entitled, "Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems," described the term ideology as having become in usage a "black box," that is a cluster concept encompassing a wide variety of complex phenomena. In view of the obscurity with which ideology as a concept has come to be used, said Sartori, it is time to determine whether ideology is an essential feature of political behavior and whether a technical meaning for the term can be devised which will make it a useful explanatory tool for political behavior.

To this end, Sartori argued that ideology is the political element of an individual's belief system, defined as a "system of symbolic orientations" ¹³⁶ or a "ideas that are no longer thought." ¹³⁷ Ideological belief structures, wrote Sartori, are conceptually opposed to pragmatic structures in that the latter can be characterized as "open" or capable of the receipt and evaluation of information on the basis of that information's intrinsic value. Ideological structures are "closed" sets, relying on absolute authority for perspective and animation rather than on "objective" data.

Ideology thus, in essence, functions as a "culture," in Sartori's words, or as a set of processing and coding beliefs about the world and, in its cognitive aspect at least, is identified with rationalism, as opposed to empiricism, in the manner in which and with which the mind forms and stores information.

But Sartori further argued that belief systems vary along emotive dimensions as well as cognitive. Ideological belief systems, he wrote, are characterized by a strong emotional element and commitment. Thus, varying along cognitive and emotive dimensions, there are four possible cognitive-emotive combinations. That belief system which is defined by a closed cognitive element together with a strong emotive content is characterized as a perfectly ideological one. That which displays an open cognitive and a weak emotive combination is a perfectly flexible or non-ideological belief system.

Given Sartori's definitions, what is explained by his schema? The author contends that conflict and consensus in a system are explicable in terms of his argument. Depending on which and how belief systems are distributed in a system, conflict or consensus can be predicted and explained. If all the parties exhibit perfectly ideological belief systems, then conflict is inevitable because of the closed and strongly-held nature of their political beliefs. Conversely, perfectly flexible systems will be productive of coalescence and consensus.

In retort to Sartori's 1969 article seeking to define ideology, John P. Diggins' "Ideology and Pragmatism: Philosophy or Passion" ¹³⁸ in the September, 1970 Review argued that the distinction Sartori offered between the political mentalities of pragmatism and ideologism was a false one.

As analyzed by Diggins, Sartori's hypothesis rested on the relation drawn between rationalism and ideology on the one hand and empiricism and pragmatism on the other. Diggins argued that the association of ideology with the cultural matrix rationalism could not be irrefutable since, in Diggins' view, both communism and fascism, certainly ideologies by any definition, were by self-assertion and in historical evidence pragmatic. Indeed, wrote Diggins, the polarity of ideology and pragmatism is not an absolute one but rather an arbitrary

one. Pragmatism is not without an ideational base, said Diggins, assuming that ideas are imminent in experience and that theory is implicit in practice. Thus, pragmatism corresponds with both Sartori's rationalistic and empirical paradigms.

Having urged the view that there exists no inner connection between ideology and rationalism or between pragmatism and empiricism, Diggins raised the riddle of how similar philosophic bases can lead to antagonistic political positions. This paradox, he wrote, is "explained if we acknowledge that political commitments are more often based on personal ideals and value judgments that are not logically tied to philosophical schools of thought." ¹³⁹ It is more valid to conceive of a Weltanschauung as being the product of "moral vision, psychic turbulence, identity anxiety, or social malaise" ¹⁴⁰ rather than as the logical terminus of a philosophic school of thought.

It would appear that Diggins' criticism and refutation of Sartori is valid to a degree. Certainly, Sartori's characterization of ideology as a "system of symbolic orientations" does not conflict with Mannheim's presentation. Similarly, his argument that ideological thought is "closed" is in accord with Mannheim in the sense that what defines an ideology is its focus on and receptivity to only certain factors in the socio-historical setting and its inability to

see either the passage or failure to yet materialize of the conditions pertinent to its positions. And yet, a Mannheimian perspective would have to reject Sartori's postulation of a diametrically-opposed, "open" empirical mind-set. If Mannheim is correctly understood, empiricism qua empiricism is itself simply the epistemological base for a particular ideological position which, if it is subjected to analysis via the total conception of the term ideology, must be seen as much an ideology as any other. What flaws Sartori's analysis is again the ideological myopia to which La Palombara referred. Sartori has generalized the particular concomitants of a particular political ideology into the definition of ideology per se.

The September, 1971 Review saw the publication of Robert D. Putnam's "Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of Ideology." In this article, Putnam expressed his concern over what he described as the lack of useful knowledge produced in the wealth of studies using the concept of ideology. "Few concepts in social analysis," he wrote, "have inspired such a mass of commentary, yet so little cumulative knowledge about society and politics."¹⁴¹ This failure, opined Putnam, is due to a recurrent confusion of definitional, empirical and normative concerns in utilizing ideology as an analytic concept. Yet, according to the author, because of the central role which ideology should play in endeavoring to explain

how men act politically, it is necessary to continue to refine and use this concept.

In his study, Putnam attempted to determine the existence of an "ideological style" of thought and the reality of a decline or end to ideological approaches to politics. Using an interview technique and survey analysis of the "political elite," those in society who exhibit maximum interest, involvement, and influence in political matters, of both Great Britain and Italy, Putnam attempted to ascertain whether certain members of the elite displayed an "ideological style" of thought, that is, a political perspective characterized by generalization, historical contextualization, moralization and utopian reference, whether those who displayed such a "style" exhibit other characteristics of attitude, specifically dogmatism and an unwillingness to compromise, and whether there was evidence in the survey of a decline in the frequency of the ideological syndromes.

Based on his findings, Putnam found validation of his first hypothesis. "Politicians," he wrote, "analyze policy in systematically different ways, and their modes of analysis vary most notably along a dimension it is reasonable to call 'ideological style'." ¹⁴² However, ideological modes of analysis do not, according to Putnam's survey, coincide with dogmatic attitudes and other characteristics popularly associated with ideological thought. Finally, Putnam found

that while measures of the hostility between elites of different ideological positions were declining, there appeared no diminution of the incidence of ideological thought. The reality of the death of ideology, he therefore concluded, depended upon the observer's definition of ideology.

As in articles previously cited, Putnam urges on the reader the view that ideologically-motivated thought and behavior exist and that an understanding of that motivation is critical to an awareness of the realities of politics. And, again, the author endeavors to refine the definition of the term. Yet, as has been argued herein previously, Putnam's demonstration is at best problematical.

Putnam's analysis suffers essentially from the same deficiencies as Christoph's and Sartori's, e.g., a failure to conceptualize ideology on a broad enough scale to encompass all political persuasions, a failure to conceive of ideology as a mind-set orienting man and men toward the social and historical world, rather than as a set of behavior attributes possessed by certain men acting under the rubric of a certain political ideology.

Ideology as an analytic tool in political science was likewise the subject of Willard A. Mullins' article, "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science" in the June, 1972 edition of the Review.¹⁴³ Ideology, said Mullins, is a persistent and ubiquitous concept in analysis "due to the

absence in our political lexicon of alternative terms that link political thought and behavior in a satisfactory way." ¹⁴⁴ Yet, ideology as a term is nothing if not ambiguous, wrote Mullins, and its ambiguity is a function of the failure of the discipline to agree on the basic properties of the term. If ideology is to be saved as a meaningful concept, it is necessary to determine the theoretical and empirical grounds for its use.

The main impediment to adequate conceptualization of ideology, wrote Mullins, is the failure to distinguish ideology from other cultural phenomena such as myth. This lack of discriminating power in turn causes the concept to lose empirical relevance. Mullins specifically cited Mannheim as exhibiting this failing, arguing that Mannheim's positing of ideology as the outlook of a social group and his distinction of ideology and utopia made the concepts incapable of empirical study because of the concepts' ambiguity and because the distinction between ideology and utopia could only be made functionally and ex post facto.

Mullins sought to distinguish ideology, myth and utopia by devising a typology based on each concept's intrinsic features. The critical attribute of ideology, argued Mullins, is its historical perspective. By historical perspective, Mullin meant a perception of historical discontinuities which generates a concern for the future of society and thus an

invented conception of that future. The exact programmatic content of this conception, said Mullins, will be dependent upon the manner in which the ideology perceives the past and present. The historical perspective of an ideology implies the possibility of imagining qualitatively different social arrangements and of conceiving how one can causally effect those arrangements. Myth and utopia, as opposed to ideology in Mullins schema, lack the historical perspective, find their classic expression in the pre-modern era, and perceive of time as non-historical.

Ideology then, for Mullins, must possess cognitive power, evaluative power, orientation towards action, and logical coherence. To have validity as an analytic tool with empirical relevance, ideology must be defined as "a logically coherent system of symbols which, within a more or less sophisticated conception of history, links the cognitive and evaluative perception of one's social condition - especially its prospects for the future - to a program of collective action for the maintenance, alteration or transformation of society." 145

In Mullins a culmination of the thought of contemporary American political scientists on the subject of ideology as an analytical tool for the discipline is reached. Mullins shares the very consistent concern for what is seen to be the need to salvage the concept of ideology; Mullins argues that a

more precise definitional and empirical framework for the concept must be found; and Mullins endeavors, unsuccessfully, to achieve a sophisticated restatement of the operational meaning of the term "ideology."

The failure of Mullins and most other writers considered here to offer an adequate statement on the nature of ideology and the role that concept can and should play in an understanding of political affairs lies in the epistemological predispositions of most authors as they approach the subject.

The definitional or conceptualizational problem of dealing with the concept of ideology seems to be an acute one. It appears that the criticism which La Palombara levelled at his colleagues approaches the root of the problem. That author, it will be recalled, argued that the end-of-ideology school suffered from an ideological bias which focused its attention and biased its findings. And yet, La Palombara's polemical argument actually is a superficial one. Most writers on the subject of ideology take as a definition of ideology the critical attributes and behavioral concomitants, the description of, a particular political ideology, the socialist-Communist. Certainly, this is a fundamental error logically in that a definition to be meaningful must offer not only a description of a single example of the phenomenon to be defined but must comprehend all examples of the subject. The error of this type of thought is, further, a critical one

for the discipline, for without a truly inclusive conception of ideology, the capability of achieving a higher level of understanding is precluded.

This bias on the part of the mainstream of American political science, however, has as its base perhaps not so much an overt political and value orientation but rather the behaviorist paradigm towards the subject under study. The behaviorist predispositions of many authors generate an attempt to fit what is seen to be an obviously important and meaningful entity, ideology, into the parameters of the positivist tradition of social analysis. And yet, given the foci of that perspective and the limitations of its methodology, only certain types of ideologies and ideological behavior fall within the range of its scope, thus necessarily causing other manifestations of ideology, as Mannheim used the term, to be ignored.

Political thought is value-directed thought and it would appear that that fact precludes an adequate understanding of ideology through the methods of the behaviorist paradigm, the approach most favored by American political science. This is, however, not to say that a traditionalist normative approach is left as the only viable approach to ideology. If ideology is understood in Mannheimian terms, the normative perspective is obviously irrelevant to a meaningful appreciation of the essence and function of ideology because of its incapability to particularize ¹⁴⁶ its values or to submit to

the relational concept of the validity of the tenets of a particular set of normative precepts.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

In Ideology and Utopia, Karl Mannheim sought to address what he perceived to be an intellectual crisis in modern times. Mannheim found the source of this crisis, this "talking past" one another when men of differing political persuasions sought to discuss the world, to lie in the divergent methods which then existed, and still exist today, by which men perceive the objective world. The cause of these differing perspectives, characterizations and definitions, Mannheim argued, was the socially-determined nature of thought. By this, Mannheim meant that man does not immediately perceive the world; rather, man's attention is focused on certain aspects of his society and history by his perspective, a perspective based on political and economic interests and shared by members of the same class. Thus, thought is a factor of one's class, its interests and the political action taken to achieve those interests.

Urging that a failure to understand the social basis of thought both resigned man to a continuation of the determination of his thought by social factors and precluded the full understanding of the nature of politics, Mannheim argued that it was possible to comprehend and overcome social

determinism. The vehicle or discipline which Mannheim devised for this quest he termed the "sociology of knowledge," a method of analysis whereby a revised intellectual history could be constructed to identify the methods of analysis characteristic of particular classes and their social evolution and by which an intellectual synthesis could be devised to transcend the limits of those class-determined analyses and to specify the political policies most valid in view of the historical, economic and social conditions existing at any given time.

In the forty years since the publication of Ideology and Utopia in the United States, American political science has been presented with data identical to that which served as the stimulus to Mannheim's work: the existence of a number of mutually-exclusive methods of analyzing and evaluating the political world. The term used by Mannheim to identify these conflicting perspectives, "ideology," has been seen by political science as fruitful description of the phenomena. Moreover, in accord with Mannheim, political scientists have endeavored to define ideology and to use the resulting conceptualization to determine the nature and function of ideological thought and behavior.

It is logical, indeed necessary in view of the insights and perspectives offered in that seminal work, Ideology and Utopia, to ask if American political science has adopted and furthered the analysis of Karl Mannheim. Further, it seems

logical to consider what the discipline in America has had to say about ideology, both in its various historical manifestations and in the abstract, and to advance some explanations for the findings of this inquiry.

As has been indicated, in considering the historical ideologies, American political science has been particularly concerned with liberalism, conservatism and socialism. To a great extent there has been a concurrence between American analysts and Mannheim as to the critical attributes of these three varieties of ideology. However, there is apparent in American political science a bifurcation in the attitude in which these historical varieties of ideology are considered. The "alien" ideologies of conservatism and socialism have been subjected to a much more rigorous criticism, a more Mannheimian analysis, than has the more familiar liberalism. It appears that the values and perspectives of liberalism have been accepted by American political science and have served as the criteria of validity against which the evolution and logic of other manifestations of the phenomenon of ideology have been measured. However, an understanding of Mannheim indicates that such a procedure serves only to "unmask" the other ideologies and not to enhance the understanding of ideology. This unmasking, based on what Mannheim termed the "Particular" conception of ideology, assumes the invalidity of the statements of another ideology and ascribes those

statements to a conscious or unconscious deception caused by the class interests of the carriers of that ideology. Such a perspective, according to Mannheim, could not serve to resolve the intellectual crisis extant in the world because no point of view was exempt from such a particular analysis and, by the process of mutual unmasking, all political perspectives were subject to that unmasking, thus undermining all such attitudes and exacerbating the scepticism of the time.

To overcome this cycle, Mannheim offered the proposition that ideologies would have to be evaluated not from some transcendent criterion of value, for such an objective standard of validity did not exist, but rather from a perspective which perceives of value as being relational. That is, since value is determined by class interests, it is only in terms of a class' particular perspective and purpose that the validity of its statements and positions can be fully comprehended and weighed. Thus, it is impossible for an observer, the political scientist, to understand an ideology from outside the ideology. It is necessary, for want of an alternative phrase, to utilize a verstehen approach to the study of ideology, to consider values in relation to the system of a particular political perspective as opposed to considering them relative to some other standard of validity.

On the basis of such an approach to the problems of ideology, Mannheim developed his total conception of ideology

whereby particular ideologies were contextualized in the course of history as to their origins and whereby ideologies were conceived to be distinct manifestations of the phenomenon of the social origination and determination of thought. As has been argued, American political science has failed to adopt or attain a similar conceptualization. The perception of ideologies by the American discipline has been the equivalent of Mannheim's "particular" conception of the phenomenon, a stage which at best precludes the development of an intellectual synthesis of ideologies which promises a higher-level understanding of political behavior and which ensures a continuation of the "talking past" polemics of ideologically-determined debate.

Although it seems clear that Mannheim would have argued that the cause of the failure to advance beyond the particular conception of ideology lay with the identification of the intelligentsia, American political scientists in this case, with a particular socio-historical class, it is argued here that the developmental block facing the discipline is a self-imposed one caused by the positivistic tradition and paradigm of American political science. That tradition, which seems to have swept the discipline contemporaneously with the recognition of existence of the phenomena of ideology, has certainly made major contributions to the study of political behavior. However, if political behavior is goal-oriented

as is argued in Mannheim and here, then the findings of positivistic political science can be no more than low-level. To understand political behavior, motivation must be comprehended and motivation is beyond the purview of quantitative analysis. Only by a verstehen approach, only by an immersion by the observer in the perspective and value system of the political actor can his behavior be comprehended. As Mannheim indicated, much important and explicable behavior exists outside the realm which is subject to quantitative analysis. Value-related behavior, political behavior, ideological behavior, is not amenable to a positivistic approach.

It was Mannheim's argument that only the intelligentsia, which he saw as being free-floating in the sense of being capable of detachment from any particular economic class, could transcend the autonomous natures of specific ideological perspectives and thereby achieve a dynamic intellectual synthesis, objectively determining the conditions existent in society. It is with hesitation that one concludes that the intelligentsia considered here, the American political scientist, is not free-floating but is rather identified with the middle-class, the class to which Mannheim ascribes the positivist tradition. Proof of the immersion of the discipline in that class is beyond the scope of this study. It can be concluded, however, that regardless of the social

origins of the positivist perspective and regardless of the class-identification of American political science, the discipline's predilection for a positivist approach has forced it to ignore Mannheim's insight into politics, has caused it to misunderstand the nature of ideology both as an historical phenomenon and as a conceptualization central to an understanding of the phenomenon, and will preclude the development of a higher-level of political behavior.

FOOTNOTES

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⁷Mannheim, p. 28.

⁸Mannheim, p. 5.

⁹Mannheim, p. 5.

¹⁰Mannheim, p. 50.

¹¹Mannheim, p. 50.

¹²Mannheim, p. 39.

¹³Mannheim, p. 40.

¹⁴Mannheim, p. 55.

¹⁵Mannheim, p. 56.

- ¹⁶ Mannheim, pp. 68-69.
- ¹⁷ Mannheim, p. 79.
- ¹⁸ Mannheim, p. 86.
- ¹⁹ Mannheim, p. 93.
- ²⁰ Mannheim, pp. 93-94.
- ²¹ Mannheim, p. 97.
- ²² Mannheim, p. 154.
- ²³ Mannheim, p. 157.
- ²⁴ Mannheim, p. 46.
- ²⁵ Mannheim, p. 49.
- ²⁶ Mannheim, pp. 163-164.
- ²⁷ J. Roland Pennock, "Reason, Value Theory and the Theory of Democracy," American Political Science Review, XXXVIII, No. 5 (October, 1944), pp. 855-875.
- ²⁸ Pennock, p. 856.
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³⁹ Alpheus T. Mason, "American Individualism: Fact and Fiction," APSR, XLVI, No. 1 (March, 1952), pp. 1-18.

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⁴⁴ Coker, p. 13.

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⁵¹ Mayo, p. 559.

⁵² Mannheim, p. 219.

- ⁵³ Mannheim, p. 122.
- ⁵⁴ Mannheim, p. 122.
- ⁵⁵ Pennock, p. 856.
- ⁵⁶ Mannheim, p. 122.
- ⁵⁷ Henry A. Kissinger, "The Conservative Dilemma: Reflections on the Political Thought of Metternich," APSR, XLVIII, No. 4 (December, 1954), pp. 1017-1030.
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- ⁶³ Wolin, p. 1000.
- ⁶⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, "Conservatism As An Ideology," APSR, LI, No. 2 (June, 1957), pp. 454-473.
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- ⁶⁶ Huntington, p. 455.
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- ⁶⁸ Huntington, p. 456.
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- ⁷⁰ Huntington, p. 468.
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⁹⁰ John A. Hollowell, "Politics and Ethics," APSR, XXXVIII, No. 4 (August, 1944), pp. 639-655.

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⁹⁴ Gabriel Almond, "Politics, Science, and Ethics," APSR, XL, No. 2 (April, 1946), pp. 283-293.

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